Chortkiv Offensive. Part I. Oleksandr Dyedyk

The Chortkiv Offensive of June 7–28, 1919, is inscribed in golden letters in the military history of Ukraine.

The defeated and morally depressed, deprived of ammunition and driven into a small corner of the homeland, the Galician Army unexpectedly defeated and forced the enemy, who was numerically superior and much better materially provided, to retreat.

The elation that enveloped the Ukrainian society of Galicia upon the news of the victory at Chortkiv and the further successes of the native army, was rightly compared by contemporaries to Easter.

The proposed book is the result of more than a quarter of a century of study of this phenomenon. Based on a wide range of sources with an emphasis on numerous archival documents of the Ukrainian and Polish sides, the course of hostilities has been carefully recreated and analyzed in close connection with the then international relations and the complex military-political situation of Ukraine.

The first part chronologically covers the events from the end of May to June 16, 1919, namely: the prehistory, course and consequences of the Chortkiv Breakthrough, the proclamation of the Dictatorship, the first steps of the large-scale reorganization of the armed forces of the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic planned by General Grekov, the origin and development of the operation plan, the fierce struggle for the strategic initiative in the battles for Buchach and Terebovlia and its victorious conclusion with the liberation of Ternopil and the elimination of the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Dniester near Nyzhnev.